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In this paper, a theoretical model was constructed to endogenously determine environmental 
weights in the agricultural sector. The conventional Political Preference Function was extended to 
include environmental weights. The model was applied to the wheat sector in the EU for the 
years 1990 and 2006. The results imply that designing protection levels that have small 
disparities between domestic and world prices and avoiding excess production cause a positive 
environmental surplus which leads to higher environmental weights. 
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   1 
Introduction  
The current path of globalization is creating environmental concerns because of increasing 
production and trade activities. Up to now, the impacts of agricultural policies were evaluated 
mostly on the welfare of producer and consumer groups, and on budgets. Despite the fact that the 
environmental impacts of agricultural policies have been examined by some studies, the 
environmental weights assigned by policymakers have not been scrutinized enough in  the 
political economy models. Both agricultural and trade policies - such as subsidies, tariffs, or 
setting standards on export and import - have impacts on production, consumption, and trade, 
consequently changing the levels of polluting emissions. It is a known fact that these pollutants 
lead to health and environmental problems. On the other hand, there is room for further study 
regarding the  weights associated with environmental concern in agricultural policymaking. 
Although endogenously formed weights and applications to agriculture were examined (Rausser 
and Freebairn, 1974; Oehmke and Yao, 1990; Johnson et al., 1993; Abler and Sukhatme, 1998; 
Ndayisenga and Kinsey, 1995; Kennedy et al., 1996; Atici and Kennedy 2005; Atici, 2005), 
environmental weights have not been examined in the literature. The originality of this study 
stems from its aim to explore  the  environmental weight perceived by policy makers in 
agricultural policy designs. It is expected that the result of this study will contribute to designing 
sustainable environmental, agricultural and trade policies. The main objective of the study is 
twofold; first to  set  up a model that determines the weight of environmental concern 
endogenously, and second to test the model for an agricultural commodity group, deriving policy 
implications for a sustainable policy design.  
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Policy-Environment Interaction 
The domestic and international agricultural policies have various impacts on welfare and 
the environment. The neoclassical economic theory indicates that every intervention in markets 
leads to inefficiencies  in  welfare. Therefore, although some policies benefit producers, 
consumers, or budgets in general, a net loss occurs in the total welfare. However, if  a policy’s 
goal is to reduce environmental pollution, some policies can be preferred to others. For instance, 
price controls, production quota, export taxes, taxes (sales or pigovian), and direct income 
support policies can be used for this purpose. However, some policies - such as price controls and 
export taxes  - are not optimal in today’s globalized economies. In this case, tax policies and 
income support seem more flexible tools in reducing environmental degradation.  The imposition 
of pigovian tax internalizes the environmental cost, forcing production to decrease to a socially 
optimum level. Agricultural trade flows can have positive or negative effects on the environment, 
depending on various indicators. For instance, the product composition of trade, availability of 
funds for environmental protection, location and intensity of production, choice of technology, 
and implementation of regulations  are influenced by trade policy instruments (OECD, 1994).  
On the other hand, differences in environmental regulations may provide a comparative 
advantage in intensive pollution production among countries, leading to pollution havens (Cole, 
2004).  
If the pollutants are charged by the amount of environmental cost caused by externalities, 
an efficient level of production can be achieved. If we consider the supply curve as sum of all the 
marginal cost curves and S1 as the marginal social cost curve after tax, then we can obtain Figure 
1. Without trade, when only private costs are considered, production occurs at Q. In this case, 
social welfare is obtained by subtracting pollution costs (ade) from the sum of the producer and 
consumer surplus (abe).  When firms are forced to pay pollution costs, they will produce at Q
1,   3 
which is the social optimum (van Beers, 2000). This social welfare (abc) is higher than pre tax 













Figure 1. Social Optimum In Case of No Trade 
 
When a small importing country opens to trade (Figure 2), the consumption increases from the 
level of balance and reaches C. Production decreases to Q1. If the pollution cost is internalized, 
production occurs at Q2. In this case, the importing country will gain whether it does or doesn’t 
produce at social optimum. A gain from trade including the private cost is (defgh). The amount 
degh is due to the decrease in polluting production and (efg) is due to the consumer surplus. If 
that country produces considering the social cost, the gain from trade is (cfq). This gain is caused 
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where the social cost is internalized, the welfare gain is higher than without trade because of the 
higher consumer surplus.  
 
 












Figure 2.  Social Optimum for Importer 
 
If that country is  an exporter (Figure 3), welfare gains are not clear. If pollution costs are not 
internalized, production occurs at Q1 and consumption at C. In this case, gains from trade (eik) 
(compensation of producer surplus to consumer surplus because of high prices) minus (edkm) 
(loss because of not considering) social cost. The net welfare may be positive or negative because 
increasing production also brings pollution. If the pollution cost is internalized by taxes (S
1), that 
country gains from that. Consumption stays at C but production decreases to Q
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      Figure 3. Social Optimum for Exporter 
 
Model 
In this study  the  conventional  PPF will be employed and extended to include 
environmental weights. The PPF studies assume that governments behave as if they maximized a 
preference function consisting of  various welfare groups (Bullock, 1994).  Therefore, 
policymakers evaluate  the welfare gains  and losses of various groups in an economy. T his 
relationship is  represented by a PPF, which is a weighted additive function of producer and 
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consumer surplus and budgetary savings (Johnson et al, 1993; Atici, 2005).  In this framework, 
we assume that governments behave as if they maximized the PPF; thus it is shown as  
 
where ? fi
 is a positive vector, in case there are many commodities, and ?ci
 is a positive scalar. 
The terms PS, CS, and B denote producer surplus, consumer surplus, and budget savings 
respectively for each commodity examined. The terms ? fi
 and ? ci
 are the political weights of the 
respective producer groups and the aggregate consumer, respectively, in country  i. After 
differentiating this equation with respect to the actions  (ai),  the weights can be calculated 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Kennedy et al., 1996). This study aims at integrating the environmental 
weight  (? ei)  in the model by  using quasi environmental rents ( ESi) through pigovain tax, 
environmental budgetary expenditures, and sector specific protection activities such as subsidies, 
income support, tariff etc. related to the environment, and it can be shown as, 
 
In order to integrate environmental weights in the PPF framework we need to define a quasi 
environmental  rent caused by various policies such as  taxes or  subsidies.  If governments 
internalize the cost with a fixed charge, say (?), then that level can be assumed as the 
environmental protection that varies according to the product and country. This can be an 
environmental tax imposed on production or sales tax imposed on inputs. In any case, such a 
policy causes a shift to the left in the supply curve, changing producer and consumer welfare and 
the  socially optimum  level of production. This level of production can be a proxy for 
environmental surplus caused by various policies. Therefore ES can be defined as the change  
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where S
e : Initial supply curve, S
so: Socially optimal level of supply after pigovian tax, and with 
subsidy 
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Therefore if a country has no pigovian tax, its ES will be minus while it will be positive for a 
country which has the tax. If a country has a subsidy, the ES will be negatively higher than in a 
country which has no subsidy and no tax.  In this case, weights can be determined endogenously 
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where  P,C,E represent  actions ( a) for government related to producers, consumers, and 
environment respectively for a commodity in a country i. 
 
Application of the Model and Results 
The procedure described above was applied to the EU wheat policy for the years 1990 and 
2006 based on the production, consumption, protections, and world prices obtained from OECD 
(2008). As can be seen in Table 1, in 1990 producers had the highest weights (1.4), followed by  
consumers. The environment had the lowest weight (0.02)  given the conventional support 
policies. Considering the fact that most agricultural policies have not valued the environmental 
quality for a long period of time, the results are not surprising. On the other hand, in 2006 the 
producer weights decreased to 0.84 and consumer weights increased to 1.16, which reflects the   8 
lower producer prices due to the EU’s changing policy towards income support. Because of the  
smaller disparity between world prices and domestic prices in 2006, producer weights decreased 
and consumer weights increased, almost equaling each other. On the other hand, fewer domestic 
distortions caused environmental weights to increase to 0.14, much higher than in 1990. A similar 
procedure can be applied to obtain environmental weights for various commodities and various 
countries for the purpose of comparison. In this way we can obtain an endogenously determined 
environmental weight index. 
 
Table 1. Estimated Weights for Wheat in the EU, 1990-2006 
  Weights 
Groups  1990  2006 
Producers  1.40  0.84 
Consumers  0.60  1.16 
Environment  0.02  0.14 
Budget  1  1 
Source: Calculated. 
Table 2 presents the calculated PPF values for different weights assigned by policy makers. As 
can be seen, when weights are one for all groups the PPF value is higher than when the weights 
are estimated. In addition, the PPF values were higher in 2006 when environmental weights 
gained importance. Therefore, a policy towards environmental protection in the wheat sector in 
the EU  would  improve PPF values and also environmental quality. The welfare generated by 
such a policy can be considered as  an  income effect that can be utilized to  further  improve 
environmental quality.   9 
Table 2.  Pigovian Tax (10 %) and  Changes in  PPF Values with  Equal and Estimated 
Weights, Million Euros 
  1990  2006 
PPF(Weights=1)  1728  2506 




In this paper, a theoretical base was constructed  to determine environmental weights 
endogenously and it was tested by using the data for wheat in the EU for 1990 and 2006.  The 
concept of quasi  environmental  rent t hrough  a  pigovian tax  was utilized  to determine 
environmental weights.  These weights reflect the political economy of agricultural protection 
displaying the lobbying powers of various groups. The results showed that environmental weights 
increased significantly from 1990 to 2006 as a result of the EU’s changing policy from payments 
to output to direct income support. Since price supports are  rather more distortive than other 
types of protection because of their link to production and pollution, a decrease in price support 
has positive impacts on the environment. Therefore, a lesser disparity between world prices and 
less production create a positive environmental surplus leading to higher environmental weights. 
The importance of these weights is that they can be calculated  for groups of products to 
determine average agriculture related weights and an index can be constructed for countries over 
the years. Future studies can explore these potentials. 
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